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Abstract
We introduce an (, δ)-jointly differentially private algorithm for packing problems. Our algorithm
not only achieves the optimal trade-off between the privacy parameter  and the minimum supply
requirement (up to logarithmic factors), but is also scalable in the sense that the running time is
linear in the number of agents n. Previous algorithms either run in cubic time in n, or require a
minimum supply per resource that is
√
n times larger than the best possible.
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1 Introduction
Suppose a trusted principal has b copies of some privacy-sensitive good, and there are n
agents interested in getting a copy of it. Each agent has some value for receiving a copy of
the good. The principal would like to choose a subset of up to b agents to receive the good so
that sum of their values is maximized.1 However, one of the agents, Alice, gets paranoid that
the others may be able to learn a lot of information about her value for the sensitive good.
In particular, here is a hypothetical scenario that Alice worries about. Suppose the principal
simply allocate to the k agents with the largest values, with Alice being one of them. Then,
all the other n− 1 agents may exchange information and figure out that only b− 1 of them
get a copy and, hence, Alice must also get one. Further suppose that the b-th highest value
among them is, say, $1,000; they would also learn that Alice’s value for the sensitive good
is at least $1,000. Is there an allocation algorithm that addresses Alice’s concerns without
losing too much in the objective?
This problem has been studied in a series of works in the last few years [14, 15, 17]. More
broadly, let us consider a general packing problem with m resources and n agents. Each
agent demands a bundle consists of a certain amount of each resource, and has a certain
value for getting it. The goal is to pick a subset of the agents such that granting them the
corresponding bundles approximately maximizes to sum of the values, subject to the supply
constraints of the resources, while protecting the privacy of any individual agent. This line
of works focus on a specific notation of privacy called joint differential privacy. In a nutshell,
it requires that for any individual agent, say, Alice in our example, an adversary shall not
be able to learn more than a negligible amount of information about the agent’s private
information, i.e., her value and demands, from the allocations and prices of the other agents.
1 This is also known as social welfare maximization in the literature of mechanism design.
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How can packing algorithms guarantee joint differential privacy? At a high level, such
algorithms leave some amount of supply of each resource unallocated in some meticulous
and randomized way, so that even if someone knows the allocations and prices of all other
agents as in Alice’s hypothetical scenario, he will not be able to learn with certainty whether
Alice gets a copy of the item, or her value for it. Further, to ensure that the objective is
approximately optimal even with the unallocated supplies, all jointly private algorithms
require the supply of each resource to be sufficiently large. Hence, the literature measures
how good a jointly private algorithm is by the trade-off between the privacy level, quantified
by a parameter  > 0, and the minimum supply requirement, subject to getting an additive
αn approximation. To this end, Huang and Zhu [17] show that a supply of
√
m
α per resource,
up to logarithmic factors, is both sufficient and necessary.
Another important consideration is the running time of the algorithms. This is particularly
relevant for (jointly) differentially private algorithms, since they generally require the size of
the dataset, i.e., n, to be sufficiently large to achieve good approximation in the objective.
We argue that practical (jointly) differentially private algorithms must be scalable in the
sense by Teng [26], i.e., the running time shall be quasi-linear in n or better. However,
the aforementioned algorithm by Huang and Zhu [17], which achieves the optimal O˜
(√m
α
)
supply requirement, is not scalable, as its running time depends cubically in n. Neither are
the earlier algorithms by Hsu et al. [14, 15]. Although Huang and Zhu [17] also propose
an alternative algorithm that is scalable, it requires a much larger supply of O˜
(√mn
α
)
per
resource. The following question is explicitly left open [17]:
Are there jointly differentially private algorithm that are scalable and at the same time
only require a minimum supply of O˜
(√m
α
)
per resource?
1.1 Our Contributions
We introduce a jointly differentially private packing algorithm that answers the above open
question affirmatively. The main theorem of this paper is the following:
I Theorem 1. There is an (, δ)-jointly differentially private algorithm such that:
1. it returns with high probability a feasible packing solution that is optimal up to an αn
additive factor, provided that the supply per resource is at least O˜
(√m
α
)
;
2. it stops in O(n) time, omitting dependence in other parameters, with high probability.
The algorithm follows the same high-level framework as the previous ones, which we
summarize below. It maintains for each resource a price (per unit of the resource), which
can be viewed as a dual variable that Lagrangianizes the corresponding resource constraint
of the packing problem. We shall imagine that the prices are posted on a public billboard
for everyone to see, including the agents and the adversary. Given the current prices, each
agent gets the bundle if and only if her value is higher than the total price of the bundle.
The agents’ decisions induce a total demand on each resource, which can be viewed as a
subgradient for the dual prices w.r.t. some dual objective. The algorithm then increases the
prices of the overdemanded resources and decreases those of the underdemended ones. This
process repeats for a certain number of rounds; the final allocation is obtained by averaging
over all the rounds. Since the agents’ allocation is coordinated only through the prices, it
suffices to ensure that the sequence of prices is privacy-preserving. This is formulated as the
billboard lemma by Hsu et al. [14].
What are the main differences between our algorithm and the existing ones? The previous
non-scalable algorithms are essentially noisy versions of some existing optimization algorithms,
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including gradient descent [15] and multiplicative weight update [17], run on the dual space
with a fix step size. They are not scalable because (1) the number of rounds needed by such
algorithm generally depends on how large each coordinate of the subgradient could be (a.k.a.,
the width of the problem), which is roughly n in our problem, and (2) the time needed to
compute the subgradient in each round is linear in n.
The scalable algorithm by Huang and Zhu [17], on the other hand, is a noisy version
of the online multiplicative weight update algorithm (e.g., [2]), which use the demand of
a single agent as an estimator of the overall demand in each round, iterating through all
agents once in a random order. However, it does not seem plausible to avoid having an extra√
n factor in the minimum supply requirement using this approach, as it is not only jointly
differentially private, but also locally private,2 in the sense that it can be implemented in a
way such that the agents add noises themselves so that even the algorithm never accesses
any non-private version of the data. The extra
√
n factor is ubiquitous in the literature of
locally private algorithms [3, 9].
In contrast, our algorithm is a noisy version of the multiplicative weight update algorithm
run on the dual space with different step sizes, which are optimized according on the scale of
the subgradient in each round. Intuitively, it chooses a small step size when the scale of the
subgradient is large, to avoid dramatic changes in prices, and a large step size when the scale
of the subgradient is small, to ensure a good enough progress. The idea of using different
step sizes is widely used in non-private packing algorithms to get width-independent running
time (e.g., [19]). Despite being standard in non-private packing, a direct combination of it
and how the existing approaches add noises to the subgradients lead to suboptimal minimum
supply requirement and/or super-linear running time in n. Instead, we need to further use
different noise scales in different rounds that are tailored to the scales of the subgradients
and, by induction, the corresponding step sizes. In a round where the scale of the subgradient
is large (respectively, small) and the step size is small (respectively, large), the algorithm
adds noises at a larger (respectively, smaller) scale to the subgradient and, in some sense,
uses up less (respectively, more) of the privacy budget. Setting noise scales adaptively over
time introduces several technical difficulties which we will address in details in the technical
sections. To get the results in Theorem 1, the noise scale is inversely proportional to the
square root of the step size. Hence, our algorithm is more precisely characterized as a noisy
version of the multiplicative weight update algorithm run on the dual space with different step
sizes and noise scales, both of which are optimized according on the scale of the subgradient
in each round. Table 1 provides a brief comparison of our algorithm and the existing ones.
1.2 Related Work
The notion of differential privacy is introduced by Dwork et al. [10]. It has evolved through a
long line of works to become a standard notion of privacy in theoretical computer science. See
Dwork and Roth [12] for a textbook introduction. A particularly related line of works study
differentially private algorithms for combinatorial optimization problems and mathematical
programs. McSherry and Talwar [21] introduce a generic (yet computationally inefficient)
method called the exponential mechanism for privately solving optimization problems whose
feasible set of output is independent on the dataset (e.g., k-means clustering). It is not
applicable to the packing problem considered in this paper, since the set of feasible allocations
2 This is not explicitly stated in Huang and Zhu [17]. Nonetheless, it follows straightforwardly from the
definition of the algorithm.
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Reference Algorithm Min Supply Running Time (in n)
Hsu et al. [15] Dual GD O˜
(
m
α
)
O(n3)
Huang and Zhu [17]
Dual MWU (fixed step size) O˜
(√
m
α
)
O(n3)
Dual Online MWU O˜
(√
mn
α
)
O(n)
This paper Dual MWU (different step sizes) O˜
(√
m
α
)
O(n)
Table 1 A comparison of the algorithm in this paper and those in previous works. n and m
denote the number of agents and number of resources respectively.  and α quantify the privacy and
approximation guarantees respectively.
crucially rely on the dataset. Hsu et al. [16] study what linear programs can be solved in
a differentially private manner. Unfortunately, packing linear programs are not among the
solvable ones [14].
Subsequently, Kearns et al. [18] introduce a relaxed notion called joint differential privacy.
It is still strong enough to provide provable privacy guarantees, but is also flexible enough
to allow positive results for problems that cannot be solved under the original notion of
differential privacy. This relaxed notion is widely used not only in resource allocation
problems [14, 15, 17] such as the packing problem considered in this paper, but also in
coordinating large games [6, 7, 18, 22, 23], privacy-presering learning [5, 25], privacy-preserving
surveys [13], privacy-preserving prediction markets [8], etc.
Recently, jointly differentially private resource allocation algorithms find further applica-
tions in regularizing strategic behaviors in the problem of learning reserve prices online in
strategic environments [20].
2 Model
For any positive integer `, let [`] denote the set of integers between 1 and `, i.e., {1, 2, . . . , `}.
Packing
Consider a packing problem with n agents and m resources. Each agent i ∈ [n] demands
a bundle of resources; let aij denote her demand for each resource j ∈ [m]. Further, agent
i has value vi for getting the bundle, and 0 for not getting it. We assume that aij ’s
and vi’s are bounded between 0 and 1, which is standard in the literature of differential
privacy. For any agent i ∈ [n], the demands aij ’s and the value vi are her private data. Let
U = {(v, a1, a2, . . . , am) ∈ [0, 1]m+1} denote the data universe. Let D ∈ Un denote a dataset
of n agents. For any resource j ∈ [m], let bj denote its supply. The goal is then to choose a
subset of the agents who get their demanded bundles, such that the sum of the values of
the chosen agents is maximized, subject to that the total demand on each resource does not
exceed the corresponding supply.
We remark that we can make two simplifying assumptions because the focal point of
the jointly differentially private packing problem lies in whether the minimum supply is
sufficiently large. First, we may assume without loss of generality (wlog) that the supplies of
all resources are equal; otherwise, we may rescale the larger ones down to be equal to the
minimum one. Second, we may focus on fractional solutions wlog; any fractional solution
can be converted into an integral one using independent rounding with essentially the same
objective and total demands on the resources, since we are in the large supply regime.
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Therefore, the problem can be formulated as the following packing linear program:
maximize
∑
i∈[n] vixi
subject to
∑
i∈[n] aijxi ≤ b ∀j ∈ [m]
0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ [n]
Differential Privacy and Joint Differential Privacy
Next, we formally define differential privacy and joint differential privacy with respect to the
packing problem. Two datasets D,D′ ∈ Un are i-neighbors if they differ only in the data of
the i-th agent, that is, if Dj = D′j for all j 6= i. We simply say that they are neighbors if they
are i-neighbors for some i ∈ [n]. Further, let Xi = [0, 1] denote the set of feasible decision to
each agent i ∈ [n]. Let X = X1×X2× · · · ×Xn denote the set of feasible outcomes, ignoring
the supply constraints. The notion of differential privacy by Dwork et al. [10] requires that
the allocation of all agents is chosen from similar distributions for any neighboring datasets
in the following sense:
I Definition 2 (Differential Privacy). A mechanism M : Un 7→ X is (, δ)-differentially
private if for any neighbors D,D′ ∈ Un, and any subset of feasible allocations S ⊆ X:
Pr
[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp() ·Pr[M(D′) ∈ S]+ δ .
The notion of joint differential privacy by Kearns et al. [18], on the other hand, allows
the allocation to each agent to depend non-privately on her own data, so long the allocation
to the other agents does not. More precisely, the notion is defined as follows:
I Definition 3 (Joint Differential Privacy). A mechanism M : Un 7→ X is (, δ)-jointly
differentially private if for any i ∈ [n], any i-neighbors D,D′ ∈ Un, and any subset of feasible
allocations to agents other than i, S−i ⊆ X−i:
Pr
[M(D)−i ∈ S−i] ≤ exp() ·Pr[M(D′)−i ∈ S−i]+ δ .
The technical connections between the two notions are best explained by the following
billboard lemma by Hsu et al. [14].
I Lemma 4 (Billboard Lemma). SupposeM : Un 7→ Y is (, δ)-differentially private. Then,
for any collection of functions fi : U × Y 7→ Xi, i ∈ [n], the mechanismM′ that allocates to
each agent i with fi
(Di,M(D)) is (, δ)-jointly differentially private.
3 Technical Preliminaries
3.1 Lagrangian
The Lagrangian of the packing linear program is:
maxx∈X minp∈[0,∞)m
∑
i∈[n] vixi −
∑
j∈[m] pj
(∑
i∈[n] aijxi − bj
)
.
Let L(x, p) denote the partial Lagrangian objective, that is:
L(x, p) =
∑
i∈[n] vixi −
∑
j∈[m]
(∑
i∈[n] aijxi − b
)
pj
=
∑
j∈[m] bpj +
∑
i∈[n]
(
vi −
∑
j∈[m] aijpj
)
xi .
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Let D(p) = maxx∈[X] L(x, p) denote the dual objective. We shall interpret pj as the unit
price of resource j for any j ∈ [m]. Given any prices p, an optimal solution x∗(p) of the
optimization problem maxx∈[X] L(x, p) is defined as, for any i ∈ [n]:
x∗i (p) =
{
1, if vi −
∑
j∈[m] aijpj ≥ 0;
0, otherwise.
We have the following envelope theorem (see, e.g., Afriat [1]).
I Lemma 5 (Envolope Theorem). Given any prices p, the derivatives of the Lagrangian
objective w.r.t. the prices, i.e., ∇pL(x, p), is a sub-gradient of D(p) when x = x∗(p).
3.2 Truncated Laplacian Distributions
The Laplacian distribution, given mean µ ∈ R and scale parameter b > 0, is a continuous
distribution defined on (−∞,+∞) such that the probability density of any x ∈ R is:
1
2b exp
(
−|x− µ|
b
)
.
Let Lap(µ, b) denote this distribution. It has mean µ and variance 2b2.
Further, we will consider the truncated Laplacian distribution with support [µ − 1 +
α, µ+ 1− α], denoted as Lap1−α(µ, b). The probability density of any x in the interval is
proportional to that of Lap(µ, b); the density is 0 if it is outside the interval. Lap1−α(µ, b)
also has mean µ, and variance O(b2). (See below for a formal statement.)
Given any mean µ ∈ [−α, α] and target standard deviation (up to a constant factor)
0 < σ ≤ α, let N (µ, σ) = Lap1−α(µ, σ). We use this notation to emphasize that the family
of noise distributions, N (µ, σ)’s, can be replaced by distributions other than the truncated
Laplacian distributions, as long as they satisfy the following properties. The proofs are
deferred to Appendix B.
I Lemma 6. The noise distributions N (µ, σ)’s satisfy that:
1. the mean of N (µ, σ) is µ;
2. the variance of N (µ, σ) is at most 2σ2.
I Lemma 7. Suppose −α ≤ µ1, µ2 ≤ α, and 0 < σ1, σ2 ≤ α satisfy that for some 0 < η ≤ α,
σ = max{σ1, σ2}, and δ > 0: (1)
∣∣ 1
σ21
− 1
σ22
∣∣ ≤ ηασ2 ; (2) ∣∣µ1 − µ2∣∣ ≤ η; and δ ≤ η ln(2/δ)σ .
Then, for any S ⊆ R, we have:
Prz∼N (µ1,σ1)
[
z ∈ S] ≤ exp(4η ln(2/δ)
σ
)
·Prz∼N (µ2,σ2)
[
z ∈ S]+ δ .
4 Our Algorithm
The algorithm follows a primal dual approach, running best response on the primal (i.e.,
allocation x) and a noisy version of the multiplicative weight update (MWU) method on
the dual (i.e., the prices p). Similar approaches are also used in the previous works that
study jointly differentially private packing problem (e.g., [15, 17]). The new ingredients of
our algorithm are the use of nonuniform step sizes as well as nonuniform noise scales, both
of which are meticulously optimized to achieve both scalable running time and the optimal
trade-off between privacy and the minimum supply requirement. In contrast, all previous
algorithms use a fix step size and a fix noise scale across different rounds.
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Algorithm 1 Private Dual MWU with Optimized Step Sizes and Noise Scales
Input:
Dataset D ∈ Un, represented by aij ’s and vi’s;
Supply (per resource) b.
Assumptions:
b ≥ O˜(√mα );
We also assume n ≥ b as the problem is trivial otherwise.
Parameters:
Upper bound on dual prices pmax = 2nb ;
Initial dual prices p1 such that p1j = pmaxm+1 for any j ∈ [m+ 1];
Upper bound on the sum of step sizes ηsum = ln(m+1)αb .
1: for t = 1, 2, . . . , until
∑
t η
t ≥ ηsum (via a private counter) do
2: Let xt = x∗(pt), i.e., the best response to pt from the primal viewpoint.
3: Let ∇jD(pt) = b−
∑
i∈[n] aijx
t
i for all j ∈ [m]; let ∇m+1D(pt) = 0.
4: Let the step size and the noise scale be:
ηt = min
{
α
b
,
α
∇1D(pt) ,
α
∇2D(pt) , . . . ,
α
∇mD(pt)
}
, σt =
√
mηsumηt ln(Tm/δ)

.
5: Draw δtj ∼ N
(
µtj , σ
t
)
where µtj = ηt∇jD(pt) for all j ∈ [m]; let δtm+1 = 0.
6: Let pˆt+1j = ptj · exp(−δtj) for all j ∈ [m+ 1].
7: Let pt+1 be such that pt+1j ∝ pˆt+1j and
∑
j∈[m+1] p
t+1
j = pmax.
8: end for
9: Let T be the number of iterations in the for loop.
Output: x¯ = 1ηsum
∑T
t=1 η
txt, where agent i observes x¯i.
See Algorithm 1 for an exposition by pseudocode.
We now describe the algorithm in more details. Let us first explain the basic dynamic of
the dual MWU algorithm. For technical reasons, we add a dummy resource with 0 supply,
and 0 demands from all agents, and assume that the dual prices sum to a fix and sufficiently
large number pmax. Starting from some initial guess p1 of the prices, say, with pmax uniformly
distributed among the m+ 1 coordinates, the MWU algorithm repeatedly calculates:
xt = x∗
(
pt
)
; pt+1j ∝ ptj · exp
(−ηt∇jD(pt)) , ∀j ∈ [m+ 1]
where ηt > 0 is the step size of round t. That is, the allocation xt is the best response to
pt, which induces a subgradient of the dual objective at pt by Lemma 5. Then, from pt to
pt+1, each coordinate j ∈ [m + 1] decreases exponentially by an amount proportional to
corresponding subgradient, before they are rescaled to sum to pmax. With appropriate step
sizes, standard analysis shows that the weighted average allocation across different rounds,
where the weight of each round is its step size, converges to an optimal allocation.3
To obtain the desired privacy guarantee, our algorithm updates the prices with zero-mean
noises added to the subgradients. Below we discuss the choice of step sizes and noise scales.
Step Sizes: Some standard choices of step sizes include uniform step sizes, i.e., ηt = η, which
is used in previous works on jointly private packing algorithms [15, 17], decreasing step sizes,
3 The prices also converge, although this is not relevant for our analysis.
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e.g., ηt = ηt , and step sizes inversely proportional to the magnitude of the subgradient, which
are what our algorithm uses (see, e.g., Koufogiannakis and Young [19], for an application in
the non-private packing problem). Intuitively, our choice of step sizes ensure that at least
one coordinate will be updated by an η amount, which in turns lower bounds the amount of
progress made in each round. Our algorithm has one caveat, however, as it further caps the
step size by an upper bound, which is set to αb for technical reasons, so that the noise added
in any single round does not affect the result by too much.
Noise Scales: Not surprisingly, our first attempt is to add a uniform amount of noise to
every round like the previous jointly private algorithms in the literature [14, 15, 17]. This,
however, either requires the minimum supply to be much larger than the best possible, or is
not scalable. To see why, let us first consider an overly-simplified argument of why uniform
noise scales work in the previous algorithms. Suppose the algorithm takes T rounds in total.
By a standard composition theorem of differential privacy (see, e.g., Dwork and Roth [12]),
adding noises at a uniform scale O˜
(√
T

)
is sufficient for achieving (, δ)-joint differential
privacy. Then, if the algorithm uses a uniform step size η, by the standard concentration
bound, the cumulative noise summing over T rounds is roughly O˜
(
ηT

)
. After averaging, this
is essentially a fixed amount of noise O˜
( 1

)
independent of T and η!
With non-uniform step sizes, however, this is no longer true. As a thought experiment,
suppose there are T ′  T rounds that have large step sizes, say, all equal to η; the rest of
the rounds can be omitted due to negligible step sizes. Note that the uniform noise scale, i.e.,
O˜
(√
T

)
, is still determined by the total number of rounds, repeating the above calculation
gives that the amount of noise after averaging is O˜
( √
T

√
T ′
) O˜( 1 ).
The lesson we learned from this though experiment is that the algorithm must choose
non-uniform noise scales: smaller noise scales for more important rounds that have larger
step sizes; and larger noise scales for less important rounds that have smaller step sizes.
More precisely, we optimize the noise scale in each round t to be inversely proportional to
the square root of the step size, i.e,
√
ηt; this is derived form a Cauchy-Schwarz inequality
to balance different aspects of the analysis. (Note that δtj ’s in Algorithm 1 denote the noises
added to the subgradients multiplied by the corresponding step size and, hence, its scale is
proportional to
√
ηt, rather than inversely proportional to it.)
Privacy-preserving Stopping Criteria: Finally, note that the stopping criteria of∑
t η
t ≥ ηsum must be implemented approximately in a privacy-preserving manner as well.
This can be done by maintaining
∑
t η
t using a standard technique called private counter (e.g.,
Chan et al. [4], Dwork et al. [11]). For simplicity of exposition, we will omit this standard
component and analyze the algorithm assuming the stopping criteria is implemented exactly.
5 Utility and Time Complexity
This section sketches the analysis of utility guarantees provided by Algorithm 1 and its time
complexity, under the assumption that the supply is sufficiently large, i.e., b ≥ O˜(√mα ).
5.1 No-regret Lemma
We first introduce a technical lemma that will serve as the overarching tool in the analysis of
the algorithm’s approximation guarantees in terms of the objective and constraint violations,
and its running time. It states that if we compare the Lagrangian objective achieved by the
sequence of xt’s and pt’s computed in the algorithm, and what could have be achieved by
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replacing pt’s with an arbitrary but fix p, the difference can be bounded. In other words, the
dual price sequence has no regret in the terminology of online learning.
I Lemma 8. For any p such that ‖p‖1 = pmax, with high probability, we have:∑T
t=1 η
t
(
L(xt, pt)− L(xt, p)) ≤ DKL(p‖p1) + ηsum ·O(αn) .
Proof Sketch of Lemma 8. We present a proof sketch of a weaker claim that the inequality
holds in expectation, which captures the bottleneck of the analysis. Further showing the
stronger claim in the lemma takes a (slightly nonstandard) concentration inequality for
martingales. See Appendix C for a complete proof of the lemma.
Readers familiar with this kind of analysis will find it standard and may directly jump to
the end to verify that the contribution from the variance term can be bounded given the
noise scales chosen in the algorithm. Fix any step t, we have the followings:
E
[
ηt
(
L(xt, pt)− L(xt, p))] = E[〈ηt∇D(pt), pt − p〉]
= E
[〈δt, pt − p〉]
= E
[〈
ln
(
pˆt+1
pt
)
, p− pt〉]
= E
[
DKL
(
p‖pt)−DKL(p‖pˆt+1)+DKL(pt‖pˆt+1)]
≤ E[DKL(p‖pt)−DKL(p‖pt+1)+DKL(pt‖pˆt+1)−DKL(pt+1‖pˆt+1)]
≤ E[DKL(p‖pt)−DKL(p‖pt+1)+DKL(pt‖pˆt+1)] .
We abuse notation and let ln
(
pˆt+1
pt
)
denote a vector whose j-th coordinate is ln
( pˆt+1
j
pt
j
)
for any j ∈ [m+ 1], in the 4th line of the above equation. The last two inequalities follow by
the generalized Pythagorean theorem and the non-negativity of divergences, respectively.
Summing over t ∈ [T ], the first two terms form a telescopic sum; it is bounded by the
first term on the right-hand-side of the inequality stated in the lemma. For the last term, we
have:
E
[
DKL
(
pt‖pˆt+1)] = E[∑m+1j=1 (ptj ln ( ptjpˆt+1
j
)− ptj + pˆt+1j )]
= E
[∑m+1
j=1 p
t
j
(
δtj − 1 + exp
(− δtj))]
≤ E[∑m+1j=1 ptj(δtj)2] = E [∑m+1j=1 ptj(E[δtj]2 +Var[δtj])] .
Note that the step sizes ensure E
[
δtj
] ≤ α. The first part on the right-hand-side sums to:
E
[∑m+1
j=1
∑T
t=1 p
t
j ·E
[
δtj
]2] ≤ αE [∑m+1j=1 ptj ·∑Tt=1 ∣∣E[δtj]∣∣]
≤ αE
[∑m+1
j=1 p
t
j ·
(
2b
∑T
t=1 η
t −∑Tt=1 ηtE[δtj])]
= ηsum ·O(αn)− αE
[∑m+1
j=1 p
t
j
∑T
t=1 η
tE
[
δtj
]]
≤ ηsum ·O(αn)− αE
[∑m+1
j=1 p
t
j
∑T
t=1 η
t∇jD(pt)
]
= ηsum ·O(αn)− αE
[∑m+1
j=1 η
t
(
L(xt, pt)−∑ni=1 vixti)]
≤ ηsum ·O(αn)− αE
[∑m+1
j=1 η
tL(xt, pt)
]
≤ ηsum ·O(αn) .
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Finally, the contribution from the variance part sums to:
E
[∑m+1
j=1
∑T
t=1 p
t
j ·Var
[
δtj
]] ≤ E [∑m+1j=1 ∑Tt=1 ptj · 4(σt)2] (Lemma 7)
≤ O˜(∑Tt=1 pmaxmηsumηt2 ) (Definition of σt’s)
≤ O˜(pmaxmη2sum )
= ηsum · O˜
(
n
α2b2
) ≤ ηsum ·O(αn) . (Assumption on b)
Putting them together proves the lemma. J
By the choice of p1, pmax, ηsum, the fact that L(xt, pt) ≥ OPT since xt’s are best responses,
and the definition of x¯, we further have it in a simpler form as a corollary.
I Lemma 9. For any p such that ‖p‖1 = pmax, with high probability, we have:
OPT− L(x¯, p) ≤ O(αn) .
5.2 Approximate Optimality
We now argue that the algorithm gets an objective that is optimal up to an O(αn) additive
factor, with the understanding that further improving it to an αn factor does not affect
any of the asymptotic bound. To do so, simply let p be such that the first m coordinates
are all equal to 0, and the last dummy coordinate equals pmax. Then, we have that
L(x¯, p) =
∑n
i=1 vix¯i = ALG. The claim then follows from Lemma 9.
5.3 Feasibility
Next, we argue that the algorithm provides an allocation x¯ that is approximately feasible in
the sense that the total demand for each resource is at most
(
1 +O(α)
)
b. To convert it into
an exactly feasible solution as stated in Theorem 1, we can simply scale the allocation down
by a 1 +O(α) factor, at the cost of further reducing the objective by at most O(αn).
Suppose resource j∗ has the largest demand. Let s =
∑n
i=1 aij∗ x¯i − b the gap between
this demand and the supply b. Let p be such that all but the j∗-th coordinate are equal to 0,
and the j∗-th coordinate is equal to pmax. Then, we have:
L
(
x¯, p
)
= ALG− pmaxs ≤
(
1 + sb
)
OPT− pmaxs .
By Lemma 9, we get that:
(
pmax − OPTb
)
s ≤ O(αn) .
Putting together with our choice of pmax = 2nb , and that OPT ≤ n, we get s ≤ O
(
αb
)
.
5.4 Time Complexity
We next show that the number of iterations of the for loop is upper bounded by a polynomial
of the parameters other than n. More precisely, we show that T ≤ O(m ln(m+1)α2 ).
To do so, we classify the iterations into m+ 1 types, according to how the step size is
chosen. If the step size is ηt = αb , we call it type 0. Otherwise, if the step size is ηt =
α
∇jD(pt)
for some j ∈ [m], we call it type j.
First, the number of type 0 iterations is at most ln(m+1)α2 , before the sum of the step sizes
exceeds ηsum = ln(m+1)αb .
Next, consider the iterations of type j, for each resource j ∈ [m]. In each iteration t of
type j, we have that ηt∇jD(pt) = α. We argue that there cannot be too many such iterations,
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because
∑T
t=1 η
t∇jD(pt) is upper bounded as a result of the approximate feasibility of x¯,
which follows from Lemma 9 as argued in the Section 5.3.
On the one hand, we have:∑T
t=1 η
t∇jD(pt) =
∑T
t=1 η
t
(∑n
i=1 aij x¯i − b
) ≤ ηsum ·O(αb) = O˜(1) .
On the other hand, suppose there are Tj such iterations, we have:∑T
t=1 η
t∇jD(pt) =
∑
t∈Tj α+
∑
t/∈Tj η
t∇jD(pt)
≥∑t∈Tj α+∑t/∈Tj ηt(−b) ≥ α|Tj | − 2bηsum = α|Tj | − 2 ln(m+1)α .
Putting together gives |Tj | ≤ 3 ln(m+1)α2 .
6 Privacy: Proof Sketch
This section sketches the proof that Algorithm 1 is (, δ)-jointly differentially private. See
Appendix D for a complete argument.
First, consider any fix step t. Suppose D and D˜ are two neighboring datasets. Further
suppose the random realizations of the first t − 1 iterations are such that x1, x2, . . . , xt−1
and p1, p2, . . . , pt−1 are identical on D and D˜. Let us consider the privacy of step t alone.
In fact, let us focus on a resource j ∈ [m]. How does the distribution from which δtj is
drawn differ on the two datasets? Suppose the step sizes are η and η˜ respectively. Then, by
the choice of step sizes in the algorithm and that ∇jD(pt) differs by at most 1, we have:∣∣ 1
η − 1η˜
∣∣ ≤ 1α .
Suppose the standard deviations are σ and σ˜, and the means are µ and µ˜, respectively
on the two datasets. They satisfy that:∣∣ 1
σ2 − 1σ˜2
∣∣ = 2mηsum ln(T/δ) ∣∣ 1η − 1η˜ ∣∣ ≤ 2αmηsum ln(Tm/δ) = ηασ2 ,∣∣µ− µ˜∣∣ ≤ η∣∣µη − µ˜η˜ ∣∣+ µ˜η∣∣ 1η − 1η˜ ∣∣ ≤ η + αηα−1 = 2η ,
where
∣∣µ
η − µ˜η˜
∣∣ ≤ 1 because it measures the difference in ∇jD(pt).
Also it’s easy to verify that ηt ≤ α. Therefore, by Lemma 7, we have that the update
from price ptj to p˜t+1j posted in round t for resource j is (t, δTm )-differentially private for:
t = O
(
ηt
σt
)
= 
√
ηt ln(Tm/δ)√
mηsum
.
Then, intuitively by the composition theorem (see, e.g., Dwork and Roth [12]), the price
sequence is (, δ)-differentially private because:
T∑
t=1
m∑
j=1
(
t
)2 = O( 2ηt ln2(Tm/δ)mηsum ) = O( 2ln(2/δ)) .
However, note that the standard statement of the composition theorem does not directly
apply here since the privacy budget t in each step is chosen adaptively. Fortunately, the
underlying argument still goes through. Again, see Appendix D for details.
Finally, the privacy guarantee of Algorithm 1 follows by the billboard lemma (Lemma 4).
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A Extended Azuma-Hoeffding Inequality
In this section we prove an extension of the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality for martingales.
I Theorem 10. Suppose X1, X2, . . . , XT is a martingale w.r.t. r1, r2, . . . , rT such that
|Xt −Xt−1| ≤ 1 for any t ∈ [T ] (with X0 = 0), and that:
T∑
t=1
Var
[
Xt
∣∣ r1:t−1] ≤ σ2
Then, we have that:
Pr
[
XT ≥ α] ≤ exp (− α24σ2 ) . (1)
Proof. For some parameter 0 < λ < 1 to be determined in the analysis, we have the following
sequence of inequalities:
Pr
[
XT ≥ α] = Pr[ exp (λ(XT − α)) ≥ 1]
≤ E[ exp (λ(XT − α))]
= exp
(− λα) ·E[ exp (λXT )] .
The main technical ingredient is an upper bound on the second part of the RHS, which
we shall prove separately as Lemma 11. By this lemma, we further get that:
Pr
[
XT ≥ α] ≤ exp (− λα) · exp (λ2σ2)
= exp
(− λα+ λ2σ2) .
Let λ = α2σ2 to minimize the exponent, we get that:
Pr
[
XT ≥ α] ≤ exp(− α24σ2
)
.
J
I Lemma 11. For any martingale as defined in Theorem 10, and any 0 < λ < 1, we have:
E
[
exp
(
λXT
)] ≤ exp (λ2σ2) .
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Proof. We will prove by induction that, for any 0 ≤ k ≤ T , for any realization of the random
bits r1:T−k, the following holds over the randomness of the remaining random bits rT−k+1:T :
ErT−k+1:T
[
exp
(
λ(XT −XT−k)) ∣∣ r1:T−k] ≤ exp(λ2(σ2 − T−k∑
t=1
Var
[
Xt
∣∣ r1:t−1])) .
Then, the lemma follows by the case when k = T .
The base case of k = 0 is equivalent to Eqn. (1) in the Theorem statement.
Next, suppose the theorem holds for some 0 ≤ k < T . The case of k + 1 then follows by
the following sequence of inequalities:
ErT−k:T
[
exp
(
λ(XT −XT−k−1)) ∣∣ r1:T−k−1]
= ErT−k
[
exp
(
λ(XT−k −XT−k−1)
)
·ErT−k+1:T
[
exp
(
λ(XT −XT−k)) ∣∣ r1:T−k] ∣∣∣∣ r1:T−k−1]
≤ ErT−k
[
exp
(
λ(XT−k −XT−k−1)
)
· exp
(
λ2
(
σ2 −
T−k∑
t=1
Var
[
Xt
∣∣ r1:t−1])) ∣∣∣∣ r1:T−k−1]
≤ ErT−k
[
exp
(
λ(XT−k −XT−k−1)
) ∣∣∣∣ r1:T−k−1] · exp(λ2(σ2 − T−k∑
t=1
Var
[
Xt
∣∣ r1:t−1]))
≤ ErT−k
[(
1 + λ(XT−k −XT−k−1) + λ2(XT−k −XT−k−1)2
) ∣∣∣∣ r1:T−k−1]
· exp
(
λ2
(
σ2 −
T−k∑
t=1
Var
[
Xt
∣∣ r1:t−1]))
=
(
1 + λ2Var
[
XT−k
∣∣ r1:T−k−1]) · exp(λ2(σ2 − T−k∑
t=1
Var
[
Xt
∣∣ r1:t−1]))
≤ exp
(
λ2Var
[
XT−k
∣∣ r1:T−k−1]) · exp(λ2(σ2 − T−k∑
t=1
Var
[
Xt
∣∣ r1:t−1]))
= exp
(
σ2 −
T−k−1∑
t=1
Var
[
Xt
∣∣ r1:t−1]) .
J
B Missing Proofs in the Truncated Laplacian Distribution
In this section, we will prove lemma 6 and lemma 7.
B.1 Proof of lemma 6: Mean and Variance
For the expectation, it’s easy to verity that the expectation of N (µ, σ) is equal to that of
Lap(µ, σ) since it’s truncated symmetrically.
Let the standard deviation of N (µ, σ) be σˆ, then we have
σˆ2 = 11−exp(−1+ασ )
∫ µ+1−α
µ−1+α (x− µ)2 12σ exp(− |x−µ|σ ) dx
= 1(1−exp(−1+ασ ))
∫ µ
µ−1+α(x− µ)2 1σ exp(x−µσ ) dx .
(2)
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Note that∫ µ
µ−1+α(x− µ)2 1σ exp(x−µσ ) dx
= (x− µ)2 exp(x−µσ )|µµ−1+α −
∫ µ
µ−1+α 2(x− µ) exp(x−µσ ) dx
= −(−1 + α)2 exp(−1+ασ )−
(
2(x− µ)σ exp(x−µσ )|µµ−1+α −
∫ µ
µ−1+α 2σ exp(
x−µ
σ ) dx
)
= −(−1 + α)2 exp(−1+ασ ) + 2(−1 + α)σ exp(−1+ασ ) + 2σ2 exp(x−µσ )|µµ−1+α
= −(−1 + α)2 exp(−1+ασ ) + 2(−1 + α)σ exp(−1+ασ ) + 2σ2 − 2σ2 exp(−1+ασ )
= 2σ2 + exp(−1+ασ )
(
2(−1 + α)σ − 2σ2 − (−1 + α)2)
Plug in it to (2), we have,
σˆ2 = 1(1−exp(−1+ασ ))
(
2σ2 + exp(−1+ασ )
(
2(−1 + α)σ − 2σ2 − (−1 + α)2)) ≤ 2σ2
B.2 Proof of Lemma 7: Privacy Property
Recall the statement of lemma 7:
For N (µ1, σ1),N (µ2, σ2), suppose −α ≤ µ1, µ2 ≤ α, and 0 < σ1, σ2 ≤ α satisfy
that for some 0 < η ≤ α, σ = max{σ1, σ2}, and δ > 0: (1)
∣∣ 1
σ21
− 1
σ22
∣∣ ≤ ηασ2 ; (2)∣∣µ1 − µ2∣∣ ≤ η; and δ ≤ η ln(2/δ)σ . Then, for any S ⊆ R, we have:
Prz∼N (µ1,σ1)
[
z ∈ S] ≤ exp(4η ln(2/δ)
σ
)
·Prz∼N (µ2,σ2)
[
z ∈ S]+ δ .
Proof. Firstly, the probability density function of N (µ, σ) is f(x) = g(x)Φ(µ+1−α)−Φ(µ−1+α) ,
where g(x) is the pdf of the original Laplacian distribution, g(x) = 12σ exp(− |x−µ|σ ), Φ(y) is the
cumulative density function of the original Laplacian distribution, Φ(µ+1−α)−Φ(µ−1+α) =
1− exp(−1+ασ ). So the pdf of N (µ, σ) is
f(x, µ, σ) =
1
2σ exp(− |x−µ|σ )
1− exp(−1+ασ )
.
To prove lemma 7, it suffices to show that the cumulative density functions F (S, µ1, σ1) and
F (S, µ2, σ2) are similar for any S ⊆ R, formally,
F (S, µ1, σ1) ≤ exp
(
4η ln(2/δ)
σ
)
· F (S, µ2, σ2) + δ .
In order to show that F (S, µ1, σ1) is similar to F (S, µ2, σ2), we firstly show that F (S, µ1, σ1)
is similar to F (S, µ2, σ1). It means that if we truncate two Laplacian distributions with same
variance and different expectations according to our parameter choosing, then the cumulative
density functions are similar, as shown in lemma 12. Secondly, we show that F (S, µ2, σ1) is
similar to F (S, µ2, σ2). It means that if we truncate two Laplacian distributions with same
expectation and different variances according to our parameter choosing, then the cumulative
density functions are similar, as shown in lemma 13. The following equation will be more
straightforward to understand that:
F (S, µ1, σ1)
F (S, µ2, σ2)
= F (S, µ1, σ1)
F (S, µ2, σ1)
· F (S, µ2, σ1)
F (S, µ2, σ2)
.
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I Lemma 12. For the parameters stated above, we have that for any S ⊆ R,
F (S, µ1, σ1) ≤ exp
(
η ln(2/δ)
σ
)
F (S, µ2, σ1) .
Proof. We will prove it point-wisely. For any x ∈ S, we have
f(x,µ1,σ1)
f(x,µ2,σ1) = exp
(
|x−µ2|
σ1
− |x−µ1|σ1
)
≤ exp
(
|µ2−µ1|
σ1
)
≤ exp( ησ1 ) ≤ exp
(
η ln(2/δ)
σ
)
.
The second inequality follows by our assumption that |µ1 − µ2| ≤ η and the last inequality
follows by our assumption of σ1, σ2 and η. If it holds at every point, then lemma 12 holds. J
I Lemma 13. For the parameters stated above, we have that for any S ⊆ R,
F (S, µ2, σ1) ≤ exp
(
4η ln(2/δ)
σ
)
· F (S, µ2, σ2) + δ .
Proof. Firstly we show that for any N (µ, σ) such that µ ≤ α, σ ≤ α, the probability of
point being far away from the center (the expectation) is small, i.e. for S = [µ− 1 + α, µ−
ln(2/δ)α] ∪ [µ+ ln(2/δ)α, µ+ 1− α],
F (S, µ, σ) =
∫ µ1−ln(2/δ)α
µ−1+α
f(x) dx+
∫ µ+1−α
µ+ln(2/δ)α
f(x) dx
= 2
1− exp(−1+ασ )
∫ µ−ln(2/δ)α
µ−1+α
1
2σ exp(
x− µ
σ
) dx
= 1
1− exp(−1+ασ )
exp(x− µ
σ
)|µ−ln(2/δ)αµ−1+α
=
exp(− ln(2/δ)ασ )− exp(−1+ασ )
1− exp(−1+ασ )
≤ exp(
− ln(2/δ)α
σ )
1− exp(−1+ασ )
≤ δ . (3)
We have the last inequality because we assume that σ ≤ α.
For S ⊆ [µ2 − ln(2/δ)α, µ2 + ln(2/δ)α], we will show it point-wisely. Note that for x ∈ S,
f(x, µ2, σ1)
f(x, µ2, σ2)
= exp
(
|x−µ|
σ2
− |x−µ|σ1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(term 1)
· 1− exp(
−1+α
σ2
)
1− exp(−1+ασ1 )
· σ2
σ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(term 2)
(4)
Then we consider the two terms in (4) separately.
For term 1, we have
exp
( |x− µ2|
σ2
− |x− µ2|
σ1
)
= exp
(
|x− µ2|
(
1
σ2
− 1
σ1
))
≤ exp(η ln(2/δ)
α
) (5)
The last inequality holds because |x − µ2| ≤ ln(2/δ)α according to the choosing of S, in
addition we assume that| 1
σ21
− 1σ2 | ≤ ηασ , and note that | 1σ1 − 1σ2 | · 1σ ≤ | 1σ21 −
1
σ22
| ≤ ηασ , so we
have | 1σ1 − 1σ2 | ≤
η
ασ .
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For term 2, we use Φ(a, b, µ, σ) to denote the cumulative density function of the region
[a, b] with a Laplacian distribution (µ, σ) :
1− exp(−1+ασ2 )
1− exp(−1+ασ1 )
· σ2
σ1
= Φ(µ2 − 1 + α, µ2 + 1− α, µ2, σ2)Φ(µ2 − 1 + α, µ2 + 1− α, µ2, σ1) ·
σ2
σ1
≤ Φ(µ2 − 1 + α, µ2 + 1− α, µ2, σ2)Φ(µ2 − ln(2/δ)α, µ2 + ln(2/δ)α, µ2, σ2) ·
Φ(µ2 − ln(2/δ)α, µ2 + ln(2/δ)α, µ2, σ2)
Φ(µ2 − ln(2/δ)α, µ2 + ln(2/δ)α, µ2, σ1) ·
σ2
σ1
≤ Φ(µ2 − 1 + α, µ2 + 1− α, µ2, σ2)Φ(µ2 − ln(2/δ)α, µ2 + ln(2/δ)α, µ2, σ2) · exp
(
η ln(2/δ)
σ
)
· σ1
σ2
· σ2
σ1
=
(
2Φ(µ2 − 1 + α, µ2 − ln(2/δ)α, µ2, σ2) + Φ(µ2 − ln(2/δ)α, µ2 + ln(2/δ)α, µ2, σ2)
Φ(µ2 − ln(2/δ)α, µ2 + ln(2/δ)α, µ2, σ2)
)
exp
(
η ln(2/δ)
σ
)
≤ (1 + 2δ) exp
(
η ln(2/δ)
σ
)
≤ exp
(
2η ln(2/δ)
σ
)
. (6)
For the inequality in the third line, in order to compare Φ(µ2− ln(2/δ)α, µ2 +ln(2/δ)α, µ2, σ2)
and Φ(µ2 − ln(2/δ)α, µ2 + ln(2/δ)α, µ2, σ1), we compare it point-wisely. For x ∈ [µ2 −
ln(2/δ)α, µ2 + ln(2/δ)α], we know that
g(x, µ2, σ2)
g(x, µ2, σ1)
= exp
( |x− µ2|
σ2
− |x− µ2|
σ1
)
· σ1
σ2
≤ exp(η ln(2/δ)
σ
) · σ1
σ2
,
where the last inequality is derived from (5).
The first inequality in the last line of (6) holds because we have proved that Φ(µ− 1 +
α, µ− ln(2/δ)α, µ, σ) ≤ δ/2, and further more δ1−δ ≤ 2δ. The last inequality follows by our
assumption that δ ≤ η ln(2/δ)σ .
Finally, we combine (4), (5), (6) together, we get that
for any S ∈ [µ2 − ln(2/δ)α, µ2 + ln(2/δ)α], F (S, µ2, σ1) ≤ exp(3η ln(2/δ)
σ
)F (S, µ2, σ2) .
(7)
Further more, combining it with (3), we get that for any S ⊆ R,
F (S, µ2, σ1) ≤ exp(4η ln(2/δ)
σ
)F (S, µ2, σ2) + δ .
J
Combine lemma 12 and lemma 13 together, we get that
F (S, µ1, σ1) ≤ exp(4η ln(2/δ)
σ
)F (S, µ2, σ2) + δ ,
which indicates lemma 7. J
C Proof of Lemma 8
Recall that under the assumption that the supply is sufficiently large, i.e., b ≥ O˜(√mα ),
lemma 8 holds: for any p such that ‖p‖1 = pmax, with high probability, we have:∑T
t=1 η
t
(
L(xt, pt)− L(xt, p)) ≤ DKL(p‖p1) + ηsum ·O(αn) .
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The analysis goes as follows:
ηt
(
L(xt, pt)− L(xt, p)) = 〈−µt, p− pt〉
= 〈−δt, p− pt〉+ 〈δt − µt, p− pt〉
=
〈
ln
(
pˆt+1
pt
)
, p− pt
〉
+ 〈δt − µt, p− pt〉
= DKL(p‖pt)−DKL(p‖pˆt+1) +DKL(pt‖pˆt+1) + 〈δt − µt, p− pt〉
≤ DKL(p‖pt)−DKL(p‖pt+1) +DKL(pt‖pˆt+1)−DKL(pt+1‖pˆt+1)
+ 〈δt − µt, p− pt〉
≤ DKL(p‖pt)−DKL(p‖pt+1) +DKL(pt‖pˆt+1) + 〈δt − µt, p− pt〉 .
In the 4th line of the above equation, we abuse notation and let ln
(
pˆt+1
pt
)
denote a vector
where the j-th coordinate equals ln
(
pˆt+1
j
pt
j
)
.
The first two terms form a telescopic sum. Further, the third term can be upper bounded
as follows:
DKL(pt‖pˆt+1) =
m+1∑
j=1
(
ptj ln
(
ptj
pˆt+1j
)
− ptj + pˆt+1j
)
=
m+1∑
j=1
ptj
(
δtj − 1 + exp(−δtj)
)
≤
m+1∑
j=1
ptj
(
δtj
)2
=
m+1∑
j=1
ptj ·
(
ηt∇jD(pt)
)2 + m+1∑
j=1
ptj ·
((
δtj
)2 − (µtj)2) .
Summing for t = 1, 2, . . . , T , we get that:
T∑
t=1
ηt
(
L(xt, pt)− L(xt, p)) ≤ DKL(p‖p1)−D(p‖pT+1) + T∑
t=1
〈δt − µt, p− pt〉
+
T∑
t=1
m+1∑
j=1
ptj ·
(
ηt∇jD(pt)
)2 + T∑
t=1
m+1∑
j=1
ptj ·
((
δtj
)2 − (µtj)2)
≤ DKL(p‖p1) +
T∑
t=1
〈δt − µt, p− pt〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
term 1
+
T∑
t=1
m+1∑
j=1
ptj ·
(
ηt∇jD(pt)
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
term 2
+
T∑
t=1
m+1∑
j=1
ptj ·
((
δtj
)2 − (µtj)2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
term 3
.
(8)
Note that DKL(p‖p1) is upper bounded by pmax ln(m + 1) by the upper bound on the
KL divergence between two non-negative vectors with `1 norm pmax. It remains to upper
bound the other three terms, which we will explain in details in the following subsections.
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C.1 Term 1.
For any t, let yt be a random variable defined as follows:
yt = 〈δt − µt, p− pt〉/pmax .
Further, let Y t =
∑t
i=1 y
i. Note that the distribution from which δt is drawn, and the dual
vector pt depends only on the realization of the random bits in the first t− 1 rounds, i.e.,
r1:t−1. Moreover, δt is subsequently realized using fresh random bits rt. Therefore, the
sequence Y 1:T is a martingale w.r.t. the random bits r1:T . Finally, the stopping criteria of
our algorithm ensures that, for any realization of the random bits r1:T , the total variance is
bounded as follows:
T∑
t=1
Var
[
yt
∣∣r1:t−1] ≤ T∑
t=1
(
σt
)2 ≤ T∑
t=1
mηsumη
t
2
= mη
2
sum
2
.
It’s easy to see that
∑T
t=1Var
[
Y t
∣∣r1:t−1] = ∑Tt=1Var[yt∣∣r1:t−1] ≤ mη2sum2 .
By an extension of the concentration bound for martingales in theorem 10, we get the
following bound with high probability:
Y T ≤ O˜
(( T∑
t=1
Var
[
yt
∣∣r1:t−1]) 12) ≤ O˜(√mηsum

)
= O˜
(√
m
bα
)
. (9)
It derives that
〈δt − µt, p− pt〉 = Y T · pmax ≤ O˜
(
pmax
√
m
bα
)
≤ ηsum ·O(αn) ,
where the last inequality is derived by plugging in the value of pmax, ηsum and applying the
assumption that b ≥ O˜
(√
m
α
)
.
C.2 Term 2
It is bounded as follows:
T∑
t=1
m+1∑
j=1
ptj ·
(
ηt∇jD(pt)
)2 ≤ α · T∑
t=1
m+1∑
j=1
ηtptj
∣∣∇jD(pt)∣∣
≤ 2α · pmaxb
T∑
t=1
ηt − α ·
T∑
t=1
m+1∑
j=1
ηtptj∇jD(pt)
≤ 2α · pmaxb
T∑
t=1
ηt + α ·
T∑
t=1
ηt · n− α ·
T∑
t=1
ηtL(xt, pt)
= ηsum ·O (2αn)− α ·
T∑
t=1
ηtL(xt, pt)
≤ ηsum ·O (2αn) . (10)
C.3 Term 3
To get a better upper bound of term 3, we further divide it into two parts, its expectation,
which is simply the sum of variances in different rounds, and the difference between the
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realizations of the expected value in each round t, which forms a martingale. Concretely, we
have:
T∑
t=1
m+1∑
j=1
ptj ·
((
δtj
)2 − (µtj)2) = T∑
t=1
m+1∑
j=1
ptj ·Varrt
[
δtj
∣∣ r1:t−1]
+
T∑
t=1
m+1∑
j=1
ptj ·
((
δtj
)2 − (µtj)2 −Varrt[δtj ∣∣ r1:t−1])
Consider the 1st term on the RHS. By the definition of the algorithm, it equals:
T∑
t=1
m+1∑
j=1
pt
(
σt
)2 = T∑
t=1
pmax
(
σt
)2 = T∑
t=1
pmax
mηsumη
t
2
= pmaxmη
2
sum
2
≤ ηsum ·O(αn) .
The last inequality is derived from our assumption b ≥ O˜
(√
m
α
)
.
Next, consider the 2nd term on the RHS. All expectations and variances below are taken
over the random bits rt in round t and conditioned on the realization of r1:t−1 in the previous
rounds. For simplicity of notations, we will omit the subscript rt and the conditions r1:t−1
in the following discussions. As the analysis are the same for different t’s and j’s, we will
further fix some t and j, and omit the superscript t and subscript j below. Finally, it is more
convenient to consider z = δ − µ as the random variable. We have:
Var
[
δ2 − µ2 −Var[δ]] = Var [2zµ+ z2 −E[z2]]
= E
[(
2zµ+ z2 −E[z2])2]
= 4µ2E
[
z2
]
+ 4µE
[
z3
]
+E
[
z4
]−E[z2]2
≤ 4µ2E[z2]+ 4µE[z3]+E[z4]
≤ 4µ2E[z2]+ 4µE[z2]+E[z2]
= (2µ+ 1)2σ2
< 2σ2 .
The rest of the analysis is identical to that of term 1. We get the following upper bound
with high probability:
T∑
t=1
m+1∑
j=1
ptj ·
((
δtj
)2 − (µtj)2 −Varrt[δtj ∣∣ r1:t−1]) ≤ O˜(pmax√mbα
)
≤ ηsumO(αn) . (11)
Combining (8), (9), (10) and (11) together, lemma 8 is proved.
D Privacy: Full Proof
The proof is almost identical to the standard composition theorem of differential privacy.
The only difference is that instead of using the standard Azuma inequality, we need to use
our extended version. Also the argument is similar in spirit to that in RRUV [24].
We first restate some textbook notations and lemmas in the proof of the standard
composition theorem.
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Define the max divergence between two random variables Y and Z, both of which take
value from some domain Ω, to be:
D∞
(
Y ‖Z) = max
S⊆Ω
ln
Pr
[
Y ∈ S]
Pr
[
Z ∈ S] .
Further, the δ-approximate max divergence is defined to be:
Dδ∞
(
Y ‖Z) = max
S⊆Ω:Pr[Y ∈S]>δ
ln
Pr
[
Y ∈ S]− δ
Pr
[
Z ∈ S] .
We abuse notation and let DKL
(
Y ‖Z) denote the KL divergence of the corresponding
distributions from which Y and Z are drawn from.
Finally, let ∆(Y, Z) denote the statistical distance between the two distributions.
I Lemma 14 (Lemma 3.17 of Dwork and Roth [12]). For any random variables Y and Z
taking values from a common domain Ω, we have:
1. Dδ∞
(
Y ‖Z) ≤  if and only if there exists a random variable Y ′ such that ∆(Y, Y ′) ≤ δ
and Dδ∞
(
Y ′‖Z) ≤ .
2. We have both Dδ∞
(
Y ‖Z) ≤  and Dδ∞(Z‖Y ) ≤  if and only if there exist random variables
Y ′ and Z ′ such that ∆(Y, Y ′) ≤ δ/(e + 1), ∆(Z,Z ′) ≤ δ/(e + 1), and D∞
(
Y ′‖Z ′) ≤ .
I Lemma 15 (e.g., Lemma 3.18 of Dwork and Roth [12]). Suppose two random variables Y
and Z satisfy that D∞
(
Y ‖Z) ≤  and D∞(Z‖Y ) ≤ . Then, DKL(Y ‖Z) ≤ (e − 1)
Consider any neighboring datasets D and D˜. Let P t and P˜ t be random variables that
are equal to the prices posted in round t running Algorithm 1 on D and D˜ respectively.
Further, let P t(p1:t−1) denote the conditional random variable conditioned on P 1 = p1, P 2 =
p2, . . . , P t−1 = pt−1; define P˜ t(p1:t−1) similarly.
The following lemma follows from the discussions in Section 6.
I Lemma 16. For any t ∈ [T ], any j ∈ [m], and any p1, p2, . . . , pt−1, we have:
D
δ
Tm∞
(
P tj (p1:t−1)‖P˜ tj (p1:t−1)
) ≤ t ,
where:
t = 
√
ηt√
mηsum
Therefore, there exists Qtj(p1:t−1) and Q˜tj(p1:t−1) such that:
∆
(
P tj (p1:t−1), Qtj(p1:t−1)
) ≤ (δ/Tm)1 + exp(t) ≤ δ2Tm
∆
(
P˜ tj (p1:t−1), Q˜tj(p1:t−1)
) ≤ (δ/Tm)1 + exp(t) < δ2Tm
D∞
(
Qtj(p1:t−1)‖Q˜tj(p1:t−1)
) ≤ t
The first two properties indicates that it suffices to show that:
Dδ∞
(
Q1, Q2, . . . , QT ‖Q˜1, Q˜2, . . . , Q˜T ) ≤  (12)
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The third property, on the other hand, implies that:
DKL
(
Qt(p1:t−1)‖Q˜t(p1:t−1)) = m∑
j=1
DKL
(
Qtj(p1:t−1)‖Q˜tj(p1:t−1)
)
≤ mt( exp(t)− 1)
≤ 2m(t)2
Consider the following martingale, with p1, p2, . . . pT drawn from the distribution of
Q1, Q2, . . . , QT :
ln
Pr
[
Q1 = p1, . . . , QT = pT
]
Pr
[
Q˜1 = p1, . . . , Q˜T = pT
] = T∑
t=1
ln
Pr
[
Qt(p1:t−1) = pt
]
Pr
[
Q˜t(p1:t−1) = pt
]
Its expectation is at most:
T∑
t=1
2m
(
t
)2 ≤ 2ln(2/δ)
The sum of variance, in the sense of Theorem 10, is also bounded by this amount. Then,
by Theorem 10, we get that with probability at least 1− δ:
ln
Pr
[
Q1 = p1, . . . , QT = pT
]
Pr
[
Q˜1 = p1, . . . , Q˜T = pT
] ≤  .
This proves Eqn. (12) and finishes the argument.
